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DRED SCOTT V JOHN F. A. SANDFORD
19 Howard, 393.
The historic importance of this case may justify an exposition of the questions embraced in it, and a brief discussion of the solutions attempted by the majority of the
Supreme Court.
Dred Scott maintained in 1853 that he, and his wife
and children were free, and that the coercion of them as
slaves by Sandford as master, was an assault. He therefore bings an action of trespass. For this action he selected
the circuit court of the United States. He did this, because
Sanford was a citizen of the State of New York, and he
conceived himself to be a citizen, as he was a resident, of
the state of Missouri, and because he assumed that the constitution of the United States, and the Act of Congress, conferred jurisdiction.
Sect. 2, of Article III of the constitution declares that
"'the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity arising under this constitution"*to controversies
"between citizens of different states' etc. If Scott was a
citizen of Missouri, the circuit court had jurisdiction of his
case.
The defendant, Sandford, by plea denied the jurisdiction, alleging that the cause was "exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the state of Missouri," assigning as a reason that Scott was not a citizen of Missouri," because he is a negro of African descent, his ancestors were
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of pure African blood, and were brought into this country
and sold as negro slaves."
It must be noted that the plea did not allege that Scott
was a slave, and therefore not a citizen. It is his descent
from a slave that is assumed to be incompatible with Missouri citizenship. An ancestor, or he might have been
manumitted by his master, if slave he had been; he might
have been made a free man by being settled by his master
in a free state, or in a territory of the United States, where
slavery was prohibited. Such emancipation or liberation
from bondage was not denied by the plea.
To this plea, Scott demurred, denying that the things
averred in it were sufficient "in law to preclude the court
of its jurisdiction of this case." After argument, the Circuit Court decided to entertain the case, sustaining the demurrer.
Pleas in bar were then filed by Sandford, alleging that
Scott was "a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant, and as such slave, he (Sandford) gently laid his
hands upon him, and only restrained him of such liberty as
he had a right to do."
Scott's replication to this plea was, in substance, that
the laying on of hands and restranit of liberty were "of his
(Sandford's) own wrong and without the cause by him in
his second plea alleged," that is, he denied that he was
Sandford's slave.
These pleas and replications were followed by the
filing of an agreed statement of the facts. It was thus made
to appear that in 1834, Scott was a slave, belonging to Dr.
Emerson, a surgeon in the army of the United States. In
that year, Emerson took Scott from Missouri to the military post at Rock Island in Illinois, and held him there as
a slave till April or May 1836. He then removed Scott
from Rock Island, to the military post at Ft. Snelling, in
what is now the state of Wisconsin, a part of the territory
of Upper Louisiana acquired by the United States from
France, and north of latitude 36 degrees 30 minutes, and
north of the state of Missouri. The Missouri Compromise
of 1820 forbad slavery in that territory. Emerson held
Scott in slavery at Fort Snelling until the year 1838.
Scott's wife, Harriet, had been a slave of Major Taliaferro, of the U. S. Army, and in 1835 he took her to Fort
Snelling, keeping her as a slave until 1836, when he sold
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her, at Fort Snelling to Dr. Emerson. She was kept there
as a slave until 1838.
In 1836 she was married to Scott
with the consent of Emerson. Two children were born to
them, for the exercise of force on whom, as well as on Harriet, their mother, and on Scott himself, this action is

brought.
In 1838 Emerson removed to Missouri, taking Scott
and family from Fort Snelling, with him. Before this suit
was begun, Emerson sold them to Sandford as slaves. As
such, Sandford laid his hands on them and imprisoned
them, as he would have had a right to do, if they were his
slaves.

Upon these facts the Circuit Court found that Scott
and family were still slaves when the acts of Sandford complained of were done, and judgment was entered for him.
Scott then sued out a writ of error from the Supreme
Court of the United States.
We shall confine our discussion mainly to the opinion
of the Chief-Justice. He introduces his opinion by stating
that there were two questions to be considered. (a) Had
the Circuit Court jurisdiction? (b) If it had, is its judgment
erroneous?
As to the ju-isdiction, could the question be considered? The appeal was by Scott. The decision as to jurisdiction has been in his favor. He was not complaining of
it, in the Supreme Court. Nor was the defendant, Sandford. On the merits he had won the judgment in the Circuit Court. Why then should the Supreme Court entertain
a question which neither of the parties was presenting to it?
The jurisdiction of the federal court is limited by the
constitution. If any court transcends the limitation, and,
the record shows that it does, the Supreme Court may
rightly take cognizance thereof whether the parties have the
right therein to raise the question and raise it, or not, "The
plea in abatement, and the judgment of the court upon it,
a e a part of the judicial proceedings in the Circuit Court,
and are there recorded as such, and a Writ of Error always
brings up to the Superior Court. the whole record of the
proceedings in the court below." The Supreme Court then
conside-ed the validity of the plea in abatement, which denied the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, although neither
party was alleging in the Supreme Court error in the Circuit Court, in assuming jurisdiction.
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To maintain the suit, Scott must be a citien of Missouri. In his declaration he alleged this citizenship. How
did the defendant dispute this allegation? Not by averring
that Scott was a slave. It is assumed by Curtis J. in his dissenting opinion, that a slave could not be and 'therefore
was not a citizen. But, the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction did not allege that Scott was a slave. It stated simply
that he was a negro; his ancestors were of pure African
blood, and had been brought to this country and sold as
slaves. "'The only matter in issue before the Court" says
Taney, C. J. "therefore, is whether the descendants of such
slaves when they shall be emancipated, or who were born
of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a state in the sense in which the word "citizen" is
used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court
must be understood as speaking, in this opinion, of that
class only; that is of those persons who are the descendants
of Africans who were imported into this country and sold
as slaves."
At this point, Taney, C. J. digresses. The reason for
his doing so is obscure. Indians and negroes were both of
a race deemed inferior to the whites, and with whom the
whites did not associate on terms of equality. The Indians
composed political communities, distinct from the whites.
Treaties have been formed with them. Like the subjects of
any other foreign government, they may be naturalized by
Act of Congress. Apparently, the Chief Justice intends to
deny the possibility of making a negro, any of whose ancestors was a slave, into a citizen by the power of naturalization.
The Chief Justice lays down the principle that only the
classes of persons in the several states, at the formation of
the Union, that were recognized as citizens, and their descendants and persons who were made citizens by the pro-cess
of naturalization, or their descendants, born in the
state, are citizens within the meaning of that word, as used
in the Constitution. Citizens of each state shall be entitled
to privileges and immunities of citizens in the other states.
Jurisdiction is conferred on federal courts in controversies
between citizens of different states.
The legislation and history of the times and the language of the Declaration of Independence show, in Taney's
opinion, that neither the slaves nor their descendants,

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

whether the latter had become free or not, were at the
adoption of the constitution, acknowledged to be or were
intended to be included under the name.citizen.
For more than a century, they had been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, unfit to associate, in social or
political relation with the whites; so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect;
that they could justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery.
This opinion was universal in the civilized world; in England : in the English colonies.
Illustrations are an Act of Maryland in 1717 forbidding intermarriage between black and white; and an Act
of Massachusetts in 1705, of similar purport. These Acts,
says Taney, C. J. show "that a perpetual and impassable
barrier was intended to be erected between the white race
and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power."
The next authority cited is the Declaration of Independence, which says "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among them is life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;
that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
These words, says the Chief-Justice, would seem to
embrace the whole human family. But, he adds, it is too
clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not
intended to be included," because, had it been intended,
there would have been a flagrant inconsistency between the
conduct of the signers of the Declaration and their announced principle. So, to preserve their reputation for consistency, we must read for "all men are created equal," all
white men are so created. But, had they said this, would
their assertion of the white man's rights have been a denial
of the black man's? This argument approaches puerility.
But had there been amelioration of the feeling towards the black race since 1705 and 1717, or since the
Declaration of Independence, when the Constitution was
adopted? No. Two passages of that instrument "show
clearly," thinks the Chief-Justice, "that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the government then formed." The first is the reservation to the
states of the right to import slaves until the year 1808. The
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second is the provision for the delivering up, to their master, of slaves who have escaped into other states. These
two provisions show conclusively that these two clauses
were not intended to confer on them (the slaves) or their
posterity the blessings of liberty, or any of the personal
rights so carefully provided for the citizen."
Reference is then made to the legislation concerning
the negro slave of states where slavery had "worn out." In
1786 Massachusetts passed a law forbidding intermarriages
of whites with negroes, mulattoes, or Indians. Though
Connecticut took steps to limit slavery, and in 1774 prohibited further importations of slaves, it retained measures
indicative of the inferior position it assigned to negroes.
They were forbidden to travel without a pass, and were
made liable to arrest if found out of the town to which they
belonged. In 1833 this state made it penal to set up a
school for the instruction of persons of the African race not
inhabitants of the state, without the written consent of the
authorities of the town in which the school might be. In
1815 New Hampshire enacted that only free white citizens
could be enrolled in the militia. In 1832 Rhode Island
passed a law declaring marriages between whites and negroes, mulattoes, and Indians null and void.
The Chief-Justice thinks that the legislation of the
states shows the inferior and subject condition of the negro
at and long after the adoption of the Constitution. These
states could not have regarded as "fellow citizens and members of the sovereignty a class of beings whom they had
thus stigmatized."
He thinks, with plausibility, that the
large slave-holding states would not have consented to the
clauses concerning citizens of the states, having the p-ivileges and immunities of citizens in other states, and concerning the rights of such citizens to maintain suits in the federal
courts, if they had understood that negroes might be made
in other states citizens, to whom these rights would attach.
"It is impossible, it would seem, to believe that the great
men of the slave holding states, who took so large a share
in framing the constitution of the United States and exercised so much influence in procuring its adoption, could
have been so forgetful or regardless of their own safety
and the safety of those who trusted and confided-in them."
They showed their unwillingness to give to the states the
power to make citizens, of foreigners, by giving to Congress
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the authority to naturalize. They gave, even to Congress,
the power to naturalize "those only who were born outside
of the dominion of the United States." The Chief-Justice
adds, "And no law of a state, therefore, passed since the
Constitution was adopted, can give any right of citizenship
(in the constitutional sense) outside of its own territory."
Reference is made to the provisions of the Articles of
Confederation providing that the "free inhabitants of each
of the states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, should be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several states," and to
the substitution of 'citizen" in the Consttiution, for "free
inhabitant." A "free inhabitant might be an emancipated
slave. Citizen is a narrower term.
Legislation of Congress is cited to show that the negroes were not deemed citizens. The naturalization Law
enacted in 1790 authorized conferring citizenship on
"aliens being free white persons," showing that citizenship
was understood to be confined to the white race. Congress had no power to naturalize negroes; hence the express exclusion of them was unnecessary.
In 1792 Congress enacted a militia law. It directed
that every f-ee, able bodied white male citizen, should be
enrolled. "White" excludes the negro "Citizen" excludes
unnaturalized foreigners.
In 1813 an Act was passed by Congress making it unlawful to employ on vessels of the United States, any persons "except citizens of the United States, or persons of
color natives of the United States."
In 1920 the charter of the city of Washington authorized the city to prohibit nightly meetings of slaves, free negroes and mulattoes, and to prescribe the fe-ms on which
free negroes and mulattoes might reside in the city.
The Chief-Justice finds that the executive department
of the government has discriminated against the negro.
Wirt, the attorney-general, in 1821 refused to grant passports to negroes as "citizens of the United States."
It was suggested that discrimination between citizens is compatible with the citizenship of those discriminated against. A citizen, e. g., women, minors, persons
destitute of a certain amount of property, may be excluded
from the suffrage, and yet be a citizen. But, says the ChiefJustice; if negroes were citizens of any state they would be
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in other states, entitled to the privileges of citizens in those
states. The states could not restrict their privileges. "if
the state will limit or restrict them, or place the party
in an inferior grade, this clause of the constitution (that
giving in every state, to the citizens of any other state,
the privilege and immunities of its own citizens) would be
unmeaning." That seems to have been injected into the
opinion to deter the negrophobes in every state, from contending that a negro might be a citizen and yet not be required to be treated in all respects as white men are treated.
Taney, C. J. then is directed to the case of Legrand
vs. Darnell 2 Pet. 664, in which, it was asserted by the attorney of Dred Scott, it had been decided by the Supreme
Court that the descendant of a slave might sue in the federal courts. But it is denied that the case holds the right
to sue, as a citizen of one state a citizen of another state.
'We are by no means prepared to say that there are not
many cases, civil as well as criminal, in which a Circuit
Court of the United States may exercise jurisdiction, although one of the African race is a party; that broad ques-^
tion is not before the court."
The Chief Justice adverts to the change of views regarding the negro, that had arisen in portions of the country. But the Constitution is what those who adopted it,
intended its language to mean. Changing sentiment must
change it by the process of amendment. Until so changed,
"it must be construed now as it was intended at the time
of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the
same in meaning." "Any other rule of construction would
abrogate the judicial character of this (the Supreme) Court
and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day."
In conclusion, the right of Scott as a citizen of Missouri, to sue a citizen of New York was denied, and it was
determined that the Circuit Court's judgment on the plea
in abatement was erroneous.
Even if the decision on the plea in abatement was not
properly before the court, since it was in favor of the plaintiff who is not complaining of 'it, the Court finds the question of jurisdiction presented by the record. Scott admitted that he had been a slave, alleging emancipation by
sundry acts of his master. If these acts did not emancipate
him he continued to be a slave, and no one asserts that a
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slave could be a citizen of a state. The absence of any
emancipation produced two effects: it destroyed the jurisdiction of the court; and it justified the acts of imprisonment alleged to constitute a trespass by Sandford. As to
the latter, the court entered no judgment. It confined itself
to the question of jurisdiction. Was, then, Dred Scott still
a slave when he brought the suit?
Objection was made to the consideration of this question after the Court had decided that the circuit court had
no jurisdiction, because Scott, whether free or not was, as
an African, whose ancestors had been slaves, unable to be
a citizen. The court asserts its right to take notice of any
error apparent on the record which affected the jurisdiction, whether there was a plea in abatement or not. The
correction of one error in the court below does not deprive
the appellate court of the power of examining further into
the record. The court below had (a) decided that it had
jurisdiction, and (b) that, o nthe merits, the judgment was
for the defendant. If it had no jurisdiction, the judgment
for the defendant was improper, as also, would have been
a judgment for the plaintiff. The only admissible judgment
would be one dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction.
The Act of March 6, 1820, known as the Missouri
Compromise, declared that slavery and involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France,
under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36 degrees thirty minutes, north latitude, and not included
within the limits of Missouri.
Scott contended that by being taken by his master to
Fort Snelling, he became free; in virtue of this statute. This
led the court to consider the authority of Congress to enact
it. Counsel for Scott found such authority in the 3d section of Article IV of the Constitution. "The Congress shall
have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the
United States or of any particular state." The court however thinks that this part of the Constitution "has no bearing on the present controversy." That the power therein
given "isconfined and was intended to be confined to the
territory which at that time belonged to, or was claimed
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by the United States, and was within their boundaries as
settled by the treaty with Great Britain, and can have no
influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a foreign government. It was a special provision for a known
and particular territory and to meet a present emergency
and nothing more." Virginia had ceded the territory north
west of the Ohio, in 1784. When the constitution was
adopted, all the states had ceded their unpeopled possessions except North Carolina and Georgia. Only this territory was meant, in the clause of the constitution in question. What is there said as to prejudicing any claims of the
United States or of any particular state, refers to North
Carolina and Georgia which had not yet relinquished their
claims to what is now Tennessee and Aabama and Mississippi, but which were expected to do so.
The exercise by Congress of jurisdiction over any of
this territory ceded to the United States by the states and
the approval thereof by the court, "can furnish no justification and no argument to support a similar exercise of power
over territory afterwards acquired by the Federal Government."
In American & Ocean Ins. Co. vs. Canter, I Peters
511, speaking of Florida, a territory acquired from Spain,
Marshall, C. J., had said: "In the meantime Florida continues to be a territory of the United States, governed by that
clause of the Constitution which empowers Congress to
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States;" but he had
immediately added that perhaps this power of Congress to
govern the territory arose from the fact that it was American territory and not within the jurisdiction of any state.
What was decided in that case was, that Congress in legislating for Florida Territory exercised "the combined powers of the general and state governments." It is immaterial
whence this power was derived. To deny that its source
was in the clause concerning "territory and other property,"
is not to deny that it had another source.
The Chief-Justice now thinks he is brought to the consideration of the question, under what provision of the Constitution, the government is authoried to acquire territory
outside of the original limits of the United States; and what
powers it may exercise therein.
He denies that the United States may establish colonies bordering on the states, or that it may increase its do-
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main except by the admission of new states.
But, the
futility of this remark speedily appears, for he admits and
defers to the construction of this power by all the departments of the government, by which it is authorized to acquire territory not fit for admission as a state, at the time,
"but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation
would entitled it to admission." How long is this interval?
Who is to decide when the necessary population and situation have been attained? "As the propriety of admitting
a new state is committed to the sound discretion of Congress, the power to acquire territory for that purpose, to be
held by the United States until it is in a suitable condition
to become a state upon an equal footing with the other
states, must rest upon the same discretion. It is a question
for the political department of the Government and not
the judicial, and whatever the Political Department of the
Government shall recognize as within the limits of the
United States, the Judicial Department is also bound to
recognize, and to administer in it the laws of the United
States so far as they apply." The question under what provision of the Constitution, territory can be acquired, is thus
vaguely answered. It is the power to admit new states.
Thence is inferred, the power to get in some way, the land
that shall be turned into such new states. The land may be
acquired 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 years before its conversion into
a state.
What power may the United States exercise in the
Alands owned by it, in the pre-state period? There is no
express regulation in the Constitution of this subject; hence
we must look at its principles and its distribution of powers.
The Chief-Justice thinks that under this rule, citizens of the
United States who migrate into a territory cannot be ruled
as "mere colonists." But what is a "mere colonist."
He
invents the theory that in acquiring territory, the United
States is a "trustee" for the several states; land acquired is
acquired for "their common use." While Cdngress may establish governments, its power over the person or property
of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power. The
constitution defines its powers. It can not establish a religion in a territory. It cannot deny to the dwellers in a
territory the right to bear arms. It cannot deprive persons
in te'ritories of their life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
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To deprive a slave master of the slave, on his entrance
into a territory, would be a violation of this prohibition.
"An Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States (but the 5th Amendment says person, not citizen)
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself
or brought his property into a particular territory of the
United States, and who had committed no offence against
the laws" could hardly," says the Chief-Justice, "be dignified with the name of due process of law."
Here then is the only tangible ground suggested for
denying the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
It deprives of slave property, merely because the slave is
brought into a territory, and such deprivation is without
due process of law.
If Congress cannot deprive the master of his slave,
neither can any local government established under its
authority.
The Chief-Justice denies that there is any difference
between slaves and other property, so far as the right of
protection is concerned. No laws or usages of other nations or reasoning of statesmen or jurists, inimical to slave
property, are relevant. "If the constitution recognizes the
right of property of a master in a slave and makes no distinction between that description of property and other
property owned by a citizen, no tribunal acting under the
authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive or judicial has a right to draw such a distinction or
deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees'
which have been provided for the protection of private
property against the encroachments of the government."
The Chief-Justice again asserts that the right of property in a slave is expressly affirmed in the Constitution.
The right to import slaves was secured to any one for 20
years after its adoption. The right to the return of fugitive
slaves, from the state into which they may have fled is
guaranteed.
The Chief-Justice then expresses the opinion of the
court that the Missouri Compromise enacted 36 years before "which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning
property of this kind in the territory of the United States
north of the line therein mentioned is not warranted by the
Constitution and is therefore void; and that neither Dred
Scott himself nor any of his family were made free by being
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carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming
a permanent resident."
But, Scott had been taken by his master to Illinois, and
there retained for nearly two years. Illinois was a free
state; Scott, had he applied to its courts might have been
declared a free man. Did this not make him free, after his
being carried back to Missouri? The answer is No. What
the effect of the residence in Illinois was, within Missouri,
was for the Missouri courts to decide; and they had decided that it did not make free the slave. Missouri holding Scott to be a slave, he was not a citizen and the circuit
court of the United States, therefore, had no jurisdiction.
It seems that Scott had brought an action against Sandford for the same cause, in the state court, had obtained a
verdict and judgment, which, on appeal to the State Supreme Court, had been reversed, on the ground that Scott
was a slave despite his sojourn in Illinois and at Fort Snelling. The Chief-Justice censures Scott for not appealing
from the State court's decision, if he deemed it erroneous,
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Instead of doing so, he began an independent suit in the Circuit Court.
The perusal of the opinion makes clear that the disposal of the case did not require a consideration of the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, whether that statute was valid or not, and hence the Circuit Court had no
jurisdiction. So to decide would dispose of the case.
The law of Missouri determined that Scott was a slave,
despite his transportation to Illinois, and therefore not a
citizen, and therefore (a) the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, and (b) if it had, its judgment for the defendant was
sound.
The court was instigated to retain the case, and to consider the Act of 1820, because that Act was the subject of
fierce controversy between the slave states and the free
states, and the court had an itching to enter into the fray,
with the majesty and authority with which the masses are
wont to invest a judicial tribunal.
We append certain letters taken from the Political History of Secession, by Daniel Wait Howe, published by
Putnams in 1914.
The first is by Justice Catron addressed to James
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Buchanan, president elect, whose term was about to begin
on March 4th next.
Thursday, Feb. 19th, 1857.
My dear Sir:The Dred Scott case has been before the Judges sev-

eral times since last Saturday, and I think you may safely
say in your inaugural
"That the question involving the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise line is presented to the appropriate tribunal to decide, to wit, to the Supreme Court of the
United States. It is due to its high and independent character to suppose that it will decide and settle a controversy
which has so long and seriously agitated the country, and
which must ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court,
and until the case now before it (on two arguments) presenting the direct question is disposed of, I would deem it
improper to express any opinion on the subject."
A majority of my brethren will be forced up to this
point by two dis.Jentients.
Will you drop Grier a line, saying how necessary it is
and how good the opportunity is, to settle the agitation by
an affirmative decision of the Supreme Court, the one way
or the other. He ought not to occupy so doubtful a ground
as the outside issue-that, admitting the constitutionality
of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, still as no domicile
was acquired by the negro at Ft. Snelling and he returned
to Missouri he was not free. He has no doubt about the
question on the main contest, but has been persuaded to
take the smooth handle for the sake of repose.
Sincerely yr. frd.
To Mr. Buchanan.

J. CATRON.

Four days later, Judge Grier wrote to Buchanan as
follows:
Washington, Feb'y 23d, 1857.
My dear Sir:Your letter came to hand this morning. I have taken
the liberty to show it in confidence to our mutual friends
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Judge Wayne and the Chief Justice. We fully appreciate
and concur in your views as to the desirableness at this time
of having an expression of the opinion of the court on this
troublesome question. With their concurrence, I will give
you in confidence the history of the case before us, with
the probable result. Owing to the sickness and'absence of
a member of the court, the case was not taken up in conference till lately. The first question which presented itself
was the right of a negro to sue in the courts of the United
States. A majority of the court were of the opinion that
the question did not arise on the pleadings, and that we
were compelled to give an. opinion on the merits. After
much discussion it was finally agreed that the merits of the
case might be satisfactorily decided without giving an opinion on the question of the Missouri Compromise; and the
case was committed to Judge Nelson to write the opinion
of the court affirming the judgment of the court below, but
leaving both these difficult questions untouched. But it
appeared, that our brothers who dissented from the majority, especially Justice Nelson were determined to come
out with a long and labored dissent including their opinions
and arguments on both the troublesome points, although.
not necessary to the decision of the case. In our opinion
both the points are in the case and may be legitimately considered. Those who hold a different opinion from Messrs. s
McLean and Curtis on the powers of Congress and the
validity of the compromise Act, feel compelled to express
their opinions on the subject, Nelson and myself refusing
to commit ourselves. A majority, including all the judges
south of the Mason & Dixon's line agreeing in the result
but not in their reasons-as the question will be thus forced
upon us, I am anxious that it should not appear that the line
of latitude should mark the line of division in the court. I
feel also that the opinion of the majority will fail of much
of its effect if founded on clashing and inconsistent arguments. In conversation with the Chief Justice I have agreed
to concur with him. Brother Wayne and myself will also
use our endeavors to get Brothers Daniel and Campbell
and Catron to do the same. So that if the question must
be met there will be an opinion of the court upon it, if possible, without the contradictory views which would weaken
its force. But, I fear, some rather extreme views may be
thrown out by some of our southern brethren. There will
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therefore be six if not seven (perhaps Nelson will remain
neutral) who will decide the compromise law of 1820 to
be of non-effect. But the opinions will not be delivered
before Friday the 6th of March. We wil not let any others
of our brethren know anything about the cause of our anxiety to produce this result, and, though contrary to our
usual practice, we have thought due to you to state in candor and confidence the real state of the matter.
Very truly yours,
D. GRIER.
Hon. James Buchanan.
P. S. It is the weak state of the Chief Justice's health
which will postpone the opinion to that time.
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MOOT COURT
PHILLIPS v. JACKSON
Lien of Judgment. Waiver of
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Philips obtained a judgment August 12th, 1911, for $600.00
against Jackson which became a lien on Jackson's farm. Jackson died September 21st, 1913. An execution issued April 13th,
1919, and the farm was levied on and sold. Jackson had devised
the farm to his widow Sarah Jackson.
She orally promised the
executor of her hubsand's estate to pay the judgment and the
executor communicated the promise in turn to the Plaintiff Phillips. Phillips bcame the purchaser of the farm at the execution
sale and claims that because of this promise of the Defendant,
he delayed the renewal of the judgment. Phillips brings this
action of ejectment for the farm against the widow and devises
under her husband's will.
Holzman for Plaintiff
Gallagher for Defendant
OPINION OF COURT
Gearhart, Judge
The question in the case in which we are most concerned is
whether this execution sale of April 13, 1919 was valid, for it
is under the title to the farm secured at this sale, that the Plaintiff bases his action. To determine whether the sale was valid
let us look to the judgment on which the execution issued.
The judgment was recovered in 1911 and in 1913 the Defendant's husband died. Nothing further was done in regard to the
judgment until September 21, 1919, when execution was issued.
This was about six years after the decease of Defendant's husband. What appears to throw light on this question is the Act
known as the Fiduciaries Act, found in the Pamphlet Law of
1917, page 447, Section 15 (g), as follows: "All judgments
which at the time of the death of a decedent shall be liens on
real estate owned by said decedent at the time of his death, or on
real estate which shall have been conveyed by deed not duly recorded during his life time, shall continue to bind such real estate
during the term of five years from his death, although such judgments be not revived by seire facias or otherwise after his death.
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Such judgments shall, during such term, rank according to their
priority at the time of such death; after the expiration of such
term, such judgments shall not continue liens on the real estate of
such decedent unless revived by seire facias, or otherwise, according to the laws regulating the revival of judgments," etc.
In the present case the plaintiff Phillips took no measures in
regard to his judgment until six years after the death of debtor.
It would seem on account of this fact that Phillips lost his lien
on the farm in question, because of the lapse of more than five
years from the death of the defendant's husband and the time of
issuance of execution; without the plaintiff making any attempt
to revive the lien of the judgment. This would seem fatal to the
plaintiff in maintaining his action, for if the lien was extinguished because of the failure to renew the judgment, the execution
sale becomes invalid and no title passes to the purchaser Phillips
at the sale. Smith vs. Wildman, 178 Penna. 245; Rankin vs. Rinehart, 66 Sup. 385.
The plaintiff contends in this case that the defendant is estopped to take defense under The Fiduciaries Act of 1917 because
she made a verbal promise to the executor of her husband'e estate to the effect that she would pay the judgment in question.
We cannot determine in this case just what right of action would
result from such promise. It is sufficient to state that if the
plaintiff has lost his lien on the land by the prevailing law of the
state, no personal promise could serve to revive the lien so that
a valid execution would issue thereon. 66 Sup. 385.
The great object of this section of The Fudiciaries Act was
to quiet title of heirs, devisees and purchasers from them to the
land derived from decedents. As was said by the Court, 19 P.
F. Smith 299, "It has been the leaning of the Courts through a
whole current of numerous decisions upon this subject to favor
the heir and to require of the creditor the vigilant prosecution
of his demand in the mode pointed out."
A proceeding to charge land of a deceased owner is strictly
in rem. Soles vs. Hickman, 29 Penna. 342; Speer vs. Sample,
4 Watts 367. The Act of 1917 on this subject is one of repose
and not merely of limitation, inuring in favor of the widow, heirs
and devisees, as well as purchasers from them. No admission or
promise however given will dispense with the strict compliance
with the Statute, if the lien is to remain against the land. Kirk
vs. Vanhorn, 265 Penna. 549; Oliver's Appeal, 101 Penna. 299;
Brindley's Appeal, 69 Penna. 295.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the plaintiff's failure
to renew his judgment or bring suit must be fatal to his cause,
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and that, notwithstanding the promise of the defendant to pay
the judgment, his lien having been lost by his failure to renew
the judgment within five years from the death of the debtor,
the sale held under the irregular execution was invalid
and the plaintiff received no title. He has not attempted to show
a better title, and the judgment must accordingly be rendered
for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When Jackson died, Phillips' judgment was a lien on his land.
It, therefore constituted a lien for five years, but unless revived,
no longer. It was not revived. The right to a lien on the land,
in order to compel payment, expired with the lapse of the five
years.
Possibly the owner of the land might estop himself from alleging the lapse of the lien, if he used any artifice or contrivance
to prevent the creditor's reviving the lien. We do not discover
here that to the use of such artifice the delay in this case is
attributable. The devisee promised the Executor to pay his debt,
but whether in the expectation that the promise should be communicated to Phillips, and should induce him to omit to revive
the judgment does not appear. She may have assumed that the
judgment was a lien and therefore she would have to pay it.
From the facts proved, we cannot discover a purpose to induce
Phillips to refrain from reviving the judgment.
A wise policy would require that a promise assumed to estop, from alleging the expiration of the lien of a judgment, should
be made in writing. The promise here was oral.
The judgment of the learned court is affirmed.
BAIR vs. CRANDALL
Replevin. Bailee's Lien
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bair leased an auto to X" for 20 weeks at the end of
which time it was to be returned in as good condition as when the
lease was made shortly before the expiration of the lease, X
placed the auto with Crandall to make needful repairs. Crandall refuses to deliver the auto to Bair until his compensation
of $80 for the repairs shall be paid. Refusing to pay, Bair
brings this replevin.
Wilks for Plaintiff
Hand for Defendant
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OPINION OF COURT
Stone, Judge
The question to be decided in this case is "Whether one who
has expended material and labor on a chattel in the possession
of a bailce for hire has a lien on the chattel for his charges as
against the bailor, even tho the repairs were necessary and
made without the bailor's knowledge and consent."
As a general rule it appears to be well settled that in the
absence of statute or express agreement, a bailor is responsible for extraordinary repairs which inure to his benefit and
which are not caused through the acts or neglect of the bailee,
but the bailee must bear the expense of the repairs which are
ordinary and incidental to the use of the thing bailed. 5Cyc. 177.
And in Myers vs. Brateapiece 174 Pa. 119 it was held
"In order to charge a chattel with this lien, the labor for which
the lien is claimed must have been done at the request of the
owner or under circumstances from which his assent can be
reasonably inferred. It does not extend to one not in privity
with the owners."
Now it is clear from the facts of the case that the first requisite of the rule as laid down in 174 Pa. 119, i. e. done at the
request of the owner, has not been fulfilled, but the learned counsel for the defense in his very able brief would have us draw the
inference from the surrounding circumstances of the case. And
quoting from the second paragraph, page 1 of his brief he says:
"The lessor knew that in letting a machine for 20 weeks, during
which time it would probably be in constant use, that repairs
would be necessary," in fact, he stipulated in the contract that
the machine must be returned in as good condition as it was at
the time of bailment. He knew that the machine must go into
the hands of a repairman, and from such a knowledge the only
reasonable influence is that he consented to the bailee turning
the car over to the repairman. In consenting he gave the bailee
authority to impose a lien on the property. Therefore, when
the bailee put the car in the hande of Crandall, he was acting
as an agent of, and under authority from Bair, the bailor."
Granting that there is some merit in this contention does
it seem logical? And that a fair inference should be drawn
from the sentence "to be returned in as good condition."? If
the words "natural wear and tear excepted" had been also in
the contract it would seem that the present plaintiff intended
that he would be liable for repairs which were needful, but when
he said what he did say he m.ant that the bailee "X" should pay
for all repairs. If we should apply the argument of defendant's
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counsel then we would also be compelled to hold that the bailor
in this case would be liable for tires and gasoline in order to
run the bailed property.
As to the contention of the defendant that he is an innocent
third party, we fail to see how he is. He could easily find out that
Bair was the true owner. He need only consult the registration
records of the State Highway Department.
Therefore, notwithstanding the exhaustive brief submitted
by the learned counsel for the defense, we do not think that the
defendant can maintain his lien against the bailor.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
To secure a lien on a chattel for work done to it, the work
must be done "at the request of the owner, or under cricumstances from which his assent can be reasonably implied. It does not
extend to one not in privity with the owner." Myers & Bro. vs.
Bratespiece, 174 Pa. 119.
Can the assent of the plaintiff be reasonably implied? The
contract of lease, we think, forbids the implication. "X", the
lessee, was to return the automobile, at the end of twenty weeks
"in as good condition as when the lease was made." Plainly, then,
it was the lessee's duty to have the repairs made at his own expense. He had no authority to contract for the repairs at the expense of the lessor, or of the lessor's property.
The repairman was bound to know whether the auto was the
property of his employer, or whether the employer, if a mere
lessee, had the authority of the owner to charge the vehicle with
the costs of the repairs. Had "X" been a thief of the auto h
could have made no title of any sort, lien or other, in favor of
another. The lessee has only the power which the lease confers
on him, and every one dealing with him with respect to the thing
leased is bound by its terms.
If the repairman had doubt about the power of "X" to bind
the automobile by a lien in his favor, he could- and should have
declined to do the work until payment was made to him, Estey
Co. vs. Dick, 41 Super 610; Stern vs. Sica, 66 Super 84.
The judgment of the learned Court is AFFIRMED.
BAKER vs. McCREIGHT
Statute of Limitations.

What lifts the Bar of

STATEMENT OF FACTS
McCreight made a note for $500 payable to Baker Jan. 1st,
1912. This action is brought March 13th, 1920. "X" proves
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that on July 7th, 1919, he, at the instance of Baker, saw McCreight, who said he owed the note and was planning to pay
it in three weeks.
Carroll for Plaintiff
Deull for Defendant
OPINION OF COURT
Anna Dickinson, Judge.
This action of assumpzdt on a note for $500, payable Jan.
1st, 1912, was begun Mar. 13th, 1920. Under the Statute which
provides that all actions of debt, grounded upon any lending or
contract, without specialty, etc., shall be brought within six
years after the cause of action arises and not thereafter if
there were no other facts in the case to be considered, then,
most certainly the defendant's plea that the action is barred by
the lapse of time would be good.
It rests with the plaintiff to show that the case has been
taken out of the operation of the Statute, which bars the remedy merely and does not discharge the debt. It is a well settled
principle of law that the remedy may be restored by a new
promise, for an acknowledgement within six years of suit is
said to waive the statutory defense. But in order to recover
the plaintiff must establish an express promise or such an acknowledgment as is clearly consistent with a promise to pay.
Lawson vs. McCartney, 104 Pa. 356
It is stated in the case that, "Baker called 'X' to prove that
on July 7th, 1919,' he had spoken with McCreight, at the instance of Baker, about the note and that McCreight stated that
he 'owed' the note, and was planning to pay it in three weeks,"
and from this statement we must ascertain whether there has
been a sufficient acknowledgment of the note in suit or an express promise to pay.
We will at once dispose of the question as to the competency of "X" to receive the defendant's ackn6wledgment. "X'
spoke to defendant at the instance of Baker, which shows that
X was not a stranger in the transaction but was Baker's agent.,
Now X spoke to the defendant about the note and defendant stated that he "owed" the note, but the note might be any
note and this reference to it falls short of being a clear, distinct and unequivocal acknowledgment of the particular debt.
In Landis vs. Roth, 109 Pa. 621, nothing was said as to the
date of the note or the amount and the note itself was not produced and it was held the debt was not sufficiently identified.
So here there is nothing to show definitely and clearly that
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the note about which witness and defendant testified is the note
in suit.
However, for our present purpose we will assume that the
note spoken of by X and MeCreight was sufficiently identified
as the note in suit. There must be expressions accompanying
the acknowledgment such as would indicate a promise to pay
the debt. Defendant told X he was planning to pay it in three
weeks. To plan to pay is not to expressly promise to pay. And
neither do we think a promise can be implied from the statement, for at most it is but an expression of intention to pay.
A declaration of an intention to pay is not the equivalent of a
promise to pay, it is more in the nature of the expression of
desire to pay and from this there is no implication of a promise. Lowrey vs. Robinson 141 Pa. 189.
It appears then that the facts in the case stated do not show
a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt or
the express promise to pay or such expressions as would
indicate a promise to pay and the Statute of Limitations is
therefore not tolled and judgment must be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
More than six years had elapsed since the note became payable, when the action on it began.
The Courts have invented sundry exemptions from the operation of the statute of limitations. If at any time, the debtor
promise to pay the debt, the limitary time will begin to run from
that promise. In this case the debtor has said that he was planning to pay the debt in three weeks. This is not a promise to pay.
But an admission of the existence of the debt will toll the
Statute, unless it is qualified so as to raise a doubt of the existence
of a purpose to pay it. We think there is here, such an admission.
MecCreight stated that he owed the note. He added that he was
planning to pay it in a named time. This, we deem a sufficiently
explicit admission of debt, without any intimation of intention to
refuse etc. Though the statement about planning to pay, is not
a promise to pay, it by no means casts doubt on the existence of
an intention to pay, discernible in the admission of the debt.
The statement of McCreight was not made to Baker, the creditor,
but to "X." It is requisite that "X" should be the representative
agent. This he was. But it is further requisite that McCreight
should have known when he made his admission that "X" was acting as the agent of Baker. Boling vs. Levy, 236 Pa. 348. That
-he knew this does not appear, a fatal defect in the evidence.
The judgment of the learned Court is therefore AFFIRMED.
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CITY OF WHEELING'S APPEAL
Trusts and Trustees--Charitable Trusts-"For benefit of the Poor"
-Equitable Conversion-Bequest of Land as Proceeds--Foreign Municipal Corporation as Trustee-Election to Reconvert.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X, in Pittsburgh, devised land in Pennsylvania to the executor
to sell it, and pay the proceeds over to Wheeling to administer for
the benefit of the poor of the city. The executor, despite the expressed wish of the city, to elect to take the land, instead of the
proceeds, is about to sell it. This is a bill to enjoin against the
sale and to permit the city to take the land as land.
Lehmayer for Plaintiff.
Mashank for Defendant.
OPINION OF TE COURT
PERRY, J. Under the provisions of this bequest, the property
of the decedent was devised to the executor to be sold and the
proceeds given to the city of Wheeling, to be distributed by them
among the poor of their city. Although this is a highly indefinite
description of the objects of the decedent's bounty, yet by the settled
law of our State, there arises, under such provisions, an implied
trust which, being for the benefit of the poor, constitutes a public
charity and will be upheld. Yaras Appeal, 64 Pa. 95; Wilman v.
Lex, 17 S. & R. 88; Kimberlap Estate, 249 Pa. 469; Re Dulles
Estate, 218 Pa. 162. (even though the trustee be of another state,-24 Pa. 474.) Under the trust thui created the city thereby becomes the trustee, subject to all the duties imposed upon other
trustees, namely, to fulfill and perform the duties and commands
imposed by the settlor of the trust; 45 Pa. 9.
And the answering of any questions which may arise as to the
construction of the testamentary provisions giving life to such
relations, must therefor be governed by the law as it exists in
the domicile of the donor, to wit the laws of this State. See the
cases cited in 20 Annoted Cases, 866.
Therefor to determine the nature and the quality of the interest held by the parties to this suit, we must perforce look to the
laws of our State, governing the same. Upon an examination of
these authorities, the court is led to the opinion that the nature of
the interest held by the City of Wheeling, as trustee, is personalty
rather than realty, an interest in the proceeds rather than an
interest in the land itself. For, by the terms of the will, there is
imposed upon the executor the express duty of selling the estate.
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This clause of the will of the testator is undoubtedly a positive and
a peremptory order to sell and it cannot be questioned that it operated as a conversion of the residuary real estate into personalty
efficacious from the moment of the death of the testator. The intent
of the testator appears to stamp the quality of personalty on the
proceeds of the land, not only to subserve the purposes of the will,
but also to define the rights of those who may claim thereunder.
Miller v. Comm. 111 Pa. 321; Bergdoll's Estate, 258 Pa. 108; McClaren's Estate, 238 Pa. 220; Williamson's Appeal, 153 Pa. 508.
The right of the testator to make his land, money, so as to
effect his own purpose, is unquestionable and it follows that the
persons claiming under the will directing the sale, must take in
the character which the will imposes upon the property, to wit,
personalty; equity regarding as done, that which was intended and
should be done. Therefor whatever rights the parties, here seeking
relief may have, the same are to be considered for all purposes as
personalty; rights not in the realty itself, but rather in the proceeds which may be derived from the sale of the realty. 222 Pa.
208.
But in the petition filed, the petitioner asserts a right to elect
to reconvert and seeks to enforce this right by taking the land
as land and not as personalty, as intended by the donor. We are
of the opinion that this assertion and alleged right cannot be upheld. While it is true that in the application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, it is well settled rule that if money be directed by a will or other instrument to be laid out in land, or land
laid out in money, as in the present case, that the party beneficially interested may in either case, if he elects to do so, cause
a reconversion of such property and take it in the original state,
yet we consider the rule to have no application under the facts of
this case as stated. Here the testator by explicit and commanding terms directed the proceeds and not the property to be given
over to the city, and by them distributed for the benefit of the
poor. And these directions must be obeyed, for to consider otherwise would be directly in the face of these positive terms, a
violation of that cardinal principle of the Pennsylvania law, that
the intent of the donor shall prevail. To consider otherwise would
be to allow the will of the trustee to thwart the will of the one who
made the trustesehip possible.
Furthermore in our opinion, the City of Wheeling is not the
proper party at law to make this election. As stated as above, the
city is merely the trustee and the poor are those who are vitally
interested. It is through the latter alone that the privilege may
be exercised. Under our laws an elcetion to reconvert must be made
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in the nature of an unequivocable demand made by all those beneficially interested; not by one or a few, but by them as an entirety.
Such a demand, to be honored must preserve the rights of all, and
none be injuriously affected. Can we, as a court, allow this reconversion to take place and say that the rights of the poor will
thereby be protected? We think not, but rather consider that the
only manner allowed us in the protection of these rights of the
poor, is by allowing the will of the donor to be exercised and not
thwarted. 63 Pa. 183; 21 Pa. Sup. 60; 13 S. and R. (Pa.) 330.
As a conclusion we state that the bill is brought, not by those
vitally interested, but by the mere trustee, and we are of the opinion that the executor has full power to sell the realty as directed;
that the election to reconvert it has not been made by the proper
party in interest, and that therefor the only right held by the petitioner is a personal right in the proceeds and not a right to the
land itself, and we do hereby decree that the bill for an injunction
to stay this sale be DISMISSED.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
That the giver of the proceeds of land could forbid the reconversion into land, is not to be doubted.
The gift here, is of the proceeds of land, to a trustee for an
indefinite cestui que trust. That the thing given, is money is clear.
Allowance of the option to take the land as land is made impracticable; because, (a) the trustee is not the beneficial owner of the
money. It is trusted, not to administer land, but money.
The
administering of the land is given to the executor. (b), The city
of Wheeling, a foreign municipal corporation, cannot hold, even
as trustee, land in Penna.
If it can take the land instead of its
proceeds, it can hold the land indefinitely. (s), Only the persons
entitled beneficially to the proceeds of the land can elect to thave
the courts reconvert the money into land. Handley's Esate, 253
Pa. 119.
The well considered opinion of the learned court below amply
sustains the conclusion reached.
Affirmed.
acticalfi,pc impr awUidfl.inb
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BOOK REVIEW
Cases on the Law of Contracts by Arthur L. Corbin Prefessor
of Law in Yale University. The West Publishnig Company, St.
Paul, Minn., 1921.
An immense debt is due to the West Publishing Company by
the Courts, the lawyers and the students of law of the United
States. Among its great services, is the publications of the American Casebook Series, which already embraces about 30 volumns,
containing cases on many of the important departments of the law,
-Property, Sales, Trusts, Evidence, Torts, Insurance, etc. The volume on Contracts covers 1500 pages, and is divided into 10 chapters, which are entitled: Offer and Acceptance, Consideration, Contracts under Seal, Operation of Contracts, and of Facts Subsequent
to Acceptance; Discharge of Contracts, Third Party Beneficiaries
Assignment, Joint Contracts, Illegal Contracts, and the Statute
of Frauds. The book is supplied with copious notes, referring to
cases according or disagreeing with the principal cases. We have
been particularly interested in the chapter on Third Party Beneficiaries, which embraces 20 cases of much interest and importance.
The chapter on Illegal Contracts covers 170 pages, and contains
many cases illustrative of various types of illegality and contravention of policy.
The book can cordially recommended, as being a repertory
of a very large number of striking cases on its subjects.

